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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES B. PETTY, et. al., 
PARTNERS, dba PETTY 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
GINDY MANUFACTURING 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10274 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Come now the appellants dba Petty Investment 
Company and respectfully petition the Supreme 
Court of Utah for a rehearing of the above entitled 
cause and for its order for a new trial in the District 
Court or in the alternative for a new opinion and 
'1 
2 
decision for the plaintiffs based on what the appel. 
!ants respectfully and strongly urge are two chiPf 
errors of law and an additional series of cumulati1., 
legal errors which led to application of wrong prin. 
ciples of law to the facts. 
Appellants concur with this Court in declaring, 
"the controversy devolves upon the second sentenct'' 
of the telegram from Gindy Manufacturing Con. 
pany to Mr. Petty with its surrounding circurn. 
stances. It does not devolve upon the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel as such, but only to the exten: 
that the factual requirements for promissory estop· 
pel also apply to the classified fact situation of thi~ 
case of an innocent or negligent misrepresentatior 
of an existing fact situation and the opinion judg· 
ment of Gindy as to a future condition to flow there· 
from, made with a deliberate intention that the plain· 
tiffs would make a substantial loan to Gindy's agent. 
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., which was done. 
To further classify this problem of estoppcl ii' 
pais let us observe that it fits into the requiremenE 
of liability for negligent representation stated in 
the Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 1~ 
Sec. 628. 
One who in the course of his business··: 
supplies information for the gui~ance. o'. 
others in their business transactions is subJ~ 1 
to liability for harm caused to them by theE 
reliance upon the information if 
(a) he fails to exercise that ca~·e ~nc 
competence in obtaining and communicatrnr 
3 
the information which its recipient is justified 
in expecting, and 
( b) the harm is suffered 
( i) by the person or one of the class of 
persons for whose guidance the information 
was supplied, (Burgess v. Calif. Mutual B. & 
L. Ass'n. 1930, 290 P. 1029 and 
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance 
upon it in a transaction in which it was in-
tended to influence his conduct .... 
The estoppel problem in this case is one of 
equitable tortious nature. Under the facts the failure 
of the duty to provide accuracy of statement to the 
inquiring plaintiff becomes the proximate cause of 
his loss if he in good faith relied on the carelessly 
made representations, and thus defendant and not 
plaintiffs must bear the loss. Williston, Liability 
for Honest Misrepresentation, (1911) 24 Harv. L. 
Rev. 415 and Harper and McNeeley, A Synthesis of 
the Law of Misrepresentation, (1938) 22 Minn. Law 
Re\·. 939. 
Appellants respectfully contend that the con-
trolling errors of the court as to this particular, 
rlassified fact situation are: 
First, procedurally, the Court erroneously ap-
plied the rule that when the trial court dismisses an 
action with prejudice and makes findings, the evi-
dence is to be reviewed in the light most favorable 
to the findings. Here the rule has no direct applica-
tion to two of the trial court's findings namely, that 
4 
the defendant was not guilty of fraudulent inte!l' 
to deceive and that the1·e was no consideration fui 
the promise. The decision of this court clearly imphes 
that those two findings have no bearing on an equit-
able action of reliance. The third finding was that 
the representations of "orders in or pending to lllOit 
than cover" $17,000 of expected commissions to 
Freeway was not false. The documents of Exhibit 
6 conclusively show that there were no "orders ... 
pending" on September 25, 1965 the date of th~ 
Gindy telegram, when the usual, ordinary and cor-
rect legal meaning is given to the word "orders" u11 
which plaintiffs relied. (App. Brief p. 21.) Becaust 
of its context the finding regarding falsity cannot 
be interpreted to mean anything more than a find-
ing that defendant had no dishonest intention to 
deceive, which for purposes of rehearing may br 
admitted. 
On the matter of reliance the Trial Court would 
have found good faith reliance had it made a finding 
on that matter. The Court said: 
I am not questioning your reliance. Your 
evidence is ample on that. (R. 107) 
Therefore two findings are immaterial on the 
question of liability for negligent misrepresentation. 
There is no finding that the reliance was legally 
insufficient. Therefore there are no probative find· 
ings of fact on which the evidence can be review'.d 
favorably or unfavorably to the decision of the tnal 
court. 
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In the matter of this Court declining to grant 
an order for a new trial, the Court erred in citing 
"8. Weodon 'V. Pearson" 14 Ut. 2d 45, 376 P. 2d 946. 
That case is not in point because the defense in that 
case was one of res adjudicata by reason of a prior 
judgment which was not appealed and the defense 
was found to be a valid one. There is here no issue 
of res adjudicata. The case is still pending and appel-
lants arguments for new trial are still probative. 
Appellants again respectfully renew their motion 
for new trial if the Court shall adhere to its first 
opinion that contributory negligence is a defense to 
an equitable action of reliance, especially since the 
issue of contributory negligence was not considered 
or decided by the trial court which is the usual and 
proper tribunal to try that kind of issue. 
Appellants respectfully contend that this Court 
fell into a second and controlling substantive error 
of law in that it applied the outmoded doctrine of 
contributory negligence as a defense to a wilful, 
albeit, negligent or innocent misrepresentation by 
which the defendant definitely intended to induce 
definite and substantial action by plaintiffs. Appel-
lants contend that the Court should have applied 
the rule of "good faith reliance" (similar to that 
legal rule in the law of Bills and Notes) which is 
the rule of law applied in practically all of the states 
except Utah. (Citations later.) 
Appellants respectfully contend that this Court 
fell into a third and fourth controlling legal errors 
in not giving to the words "dealer," and particularly 
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to the wo:d "order,_" :~eir established legal meaning 
as found m the defm1t10ns of the respective volumes 
of Words and Phrases; which meanings are also their 
usual and customary meanings as understood by all 
businessmen except Mr. Ginsburg and Mr. Walters 
of Gindy Manufacturing Company because of their 
special method of doing business, unknown to plair. 
tiffs. 
The definition of "dealer" from Words and 
Phrases is "a person who buys and sells automobiles" 
(or trailers, etc.) "for himself and on his own ac-
count." 
Moore v. State, 79 SE. 76, 148 Ga. 45i. 
Saunders v. Russel, 78 Tenn. ( 10 Lea.) 293. 
In re Hemming (D.C. Miss. 51 F. 2d 850, and 
numerous other cases all to the same effect. 
For a leading case on the distinction between 
persons operating as dealers and those operating as 
agents see S. B. McMaster v. Chevrolet Motor Com· 
pany, 3 F. 2d 469 (1925). 
In this case the evidence is uncontradicte<l and 
conclusive that neither G. H. Mickelson nor Freeway 
Trailer Sales Inc. ever during the year following 
the signing of Mirkelson to become a franchised deal· 
er of Gindy ever purchased and resold one Gind)' 
trailer on either of their own accounts. That being 
true Mickelson did not, as this Court finds, operate 
as a franchised dealer. What was the relation of thl 
parties involved? 
No member of this Court will deny the principle 
of law that either prior to the time for performanc1 
7 
0£ a cont1·act (or after performance is begun) the 
parties may agree that one or both (or the corpora-
tion dominated by one of the parties) shall do some-
thing different from what the original contract 
specified. Williston and Thompson, Contracts, Rev. 
ed.; 1938 Vol. 3. Sec. 680. 
It was error for the Court to find that the evi-
dence was not offered of a change of parties to the 
contract and that Freeway operated as a soliciting 
agent of Gindy. It is not a question of offering of 
r1·idence - The evidence was offered and was ad-
mitted both documentary (See Exhibits 6, summar-
ized p. 21 of App. orig. brief) and by oral testimony 
that Freeway did operate as and was approved and 
accepted as the soliciting agent of Gindy. 
That being the uncontradicted and conclusive 
~\iclence in the case, Freeway was entitled to the 
commission Pa1·ned in the Morrison case where the 
specifications for an offer became an order by de-
termination of price and by acceptance by Gindy of 
a note from Morrison. (See Morrison transaction -
one of Exhibits 6.) Appellants respectfully contend 
they arc entitled to have the law of agency and 
'.lssignment ruled in their favor on the Morrison 
order and on the Peeble's solicitation for an offer 
from Gindy which failed because of their unwar-
rnntecl delay in perfecting the agent's work to a 
completed order. 
Thus also it was a controlling error for this 
Court by means of interpretation to excise the word 
" ,] o1·uer" from the phrase "orders pending" found in 
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the Gindy telegram and to i·eplace it by enoneouo 
interpretation with the word "negotiations" by gi\. 
ing an unusual, non-customary, unnatural, strained 
and entirely different meaning to the phrase "orders 
pending" than the ordinary prudent businessman 
would understand from "orders pending." We re-
spectfully submit that it was error to force plaintiff: 
to accept the unnatural meaning adopted by the 
Court, namely, that "orders pending" meant not 
"orders pending" but meant only "negotiations pend-
ing for later hoped-for orders." The writings were 
merely solicitations for offers from Gindy. Had tht 
written representation by Gindy read "negotiatiom 
pending for later hoped-for orders" or "deals in pro-
gress" it would have been preposterous for plaintiffi 
to have relied; and it is impossible to believe ther 
would have relied on any such a representation he· 
cause after the first telephone call, it was made clear 
to Gindy by the second telephone call that no loan 
would be made if Gindy merely stated that they 
would only acknowledge an assignment of commis· 
sions. A representation of assurance of repayment 
was demanded and was received and relied on aml 
acted on. 
The above controlling errors resulted primaril;, 
from the Court's error of applying the old historical 
rule of the early nineteenth century of caveat emptor 
which did in those years allow the defense of con· 
tributory negligence to an action of deceit. The ~en· 
eral middle nineteenth century rule is that contnbu· 
tory negligence is not a defense to a fraudulent, nor 
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a nun-fraudulent, representation which the repre-
sentator deliberately intends the representee to rely 
upon to his substantial detriment. Prosser, Torts, 
~ire! ed., Reliance, 370-37 4. Law is more and more 
coming to regard substance more than form. Today's 
law is more and more caveat venditor. Whether a 
reprrsentation intended to produce substantial re-
liance be fraudulent or non-fraudulent the out-of-
pocket damages to the representee relying thereon 
will, as in this case, be the same. That is the true 
substance of the transaction. It is generally and 
should be the substance of the law. This is wherein 
the liability arises for negligent or innocent misrep-
resentation intended to induce a substantial change 
of position by the representee. 
Additional cumulative errors are: 
(a) The Court erred in failing to recognize that 
a loan to Freeway Sales Inc. as Gindy's agent would 
indirectly benefit the defendant by having its agent 
financed by another which is a fact helping to classi-
fy different types of representation situations -
See classes of representation and promissory estop-
pel situations in the Williston and Harper and Mc-
Neeley articles, supra. 
(b) The Court erred in holding that plaintiff's 
claim for recovery is based on promissory estoppel 
as stated earlier. The Court stated plaintiff's posi-
tion correctly in paragraph 11 when it wrote: "The 
controversy devolves upon the second sentence." 
Plaintiff's claim of right to recover damages rests 
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not on the terms of the dependent and subonlin8i1 
promise but rests solely on good faith relianc(' 11! 
plaintiffs on the false representations of Gind~· that 
it had received from G. H. Mickelson and or Fih-
way Sales Inc. "sufficient" ... "ordas in or pt111 J. 
ing to more than cover" a loan of $12,000 which 
the telegram was intended to and did induce. (S~e 
appellant's reply brief 1-7.) · 
( c) The Court erred in putting any weight u11 
the statement in the Monday assignment, that FM-
way was assigning future earnings "after deals \\Wt 
finalized and financing arrangements completed. 
There was only talk of an assignment on Saturclat 
No assignment was written on September 25, 1962. 
The reliance on the representation in the telegram 
occurred on that Saturday. The assignment 1.vas tw 
days after the fact and concurrent with the delirn!· 
of the check and there was no reason for Mr. Pett:. 
to examine it except to see the figure $44,300.00 wa~ 
there. There is no evidence whatever that the abow 
phrase relied on in part by the Court was brought 
to the attention of Mr. Petty. Certainly Mr. Michl-
son would not call that phrase to Mr. Petty's ntlo1• 
tion on M onda.y when he came for the check. He 
would not prejudice his chances to get the check. Mr 
Petty testified he would not rely on anything Mickel-
son said. He would rely only on whatever Gindy 
would say. 
( d) The Court erred in adopting the reasoning 
of equating an equitable action based on an innocen: 
or negligent misrepresentation with legal suretyship 
> 
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or guaranty. Williston's article supra on Liability 
for Honest Misrep1·esentation is conclusive that lia-
bility for innocent or negligent misrepresentation 
has been recognized as distinct equitable action in 
equity, at least since Burrows v. Lock, 10 Ves. Jy. 
470, 32 Eng. Rep. 927 ( 1905). 
THE LAW OF GOOD FAITH RELIANCE 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the com-
paratively recent case of May et. al. v. City of Kear-
ney et. ol. ( 1945) 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W. 2d 448, 
upheld an cstoppel in pais against honest representa-
tions of city officials that general obligation bonds 
would not be issued to purchase a Consumer's Power 
Plant and declared the good faith reliance rule as 
the governing rule in relying on representations of 
opinion, under the circumstances of that case. 
The Court said: 
Equitable estoppels operate as effectual-
ly as technical estoppels. They cannot in the 
nature of things be subjected to fixed and 
settled rules of universal application, like legal 
estoppels, nor hammered by the narrow con-
fines of a technical formula .... 
The following however may be ventured 
as the sum of all cases: That a person is held 
to a representation made or a position as-
sumed, where otherwise inequitable conse-
quences would result to another, who having 
a right to do so, under all the circumstances 
of the case, has IN GOOD FAITH RELIED 
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TH_EREO~. S.uch estoppel ~s founded on mo-
ra.hty and JUstic~, and especially concerns con-
science and eqmty. 10 R. D. L., p. 236. (1; 
N.W. R. 2d, 448, 458.) 
A check upon C.J .S. Sec. 59 and the 1964 Sup-
plement, Sec. 59 thereto shows the following state~ 
as adhering to the good faith reliance rule whid1 
necessarily rejects the old contributory negligence 
rule: Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill., 
Ind., Ky., Me., Md., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., 
N.J., N. Mex., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio., Okla., Ore., 
Pa., R.I., Tenn., Tex., and Wash. 
The thoroughly and extensively analyzed cast 
of Schafer v. Fraser, ( 1955) 206 Ore. 466, 290 P. 2a. 
190, 48 A.L.R. 2d 1087 places the duty of care wherr 
it should be and uses the ordinary test of tort lair: 
That the representor will be liable to the person pro1-
imately injured in good faith reliance provided the 
representator could forsee as a reasonably prudenr 
man that the "language" used will induce conduc: 
of the kind that occurred. 
Why is good faith reliance justifiable relianee 
upon representations deliberately made to an inter-
ested inquirer to produce reliance by him to his sun-
stantial detriment? 
The answer lies first in the justice and fairneii 
of requiring not only honesty but due care in makin~ 
representations to an inquirer whom the representoi 
13 
intends shall i·ely and act on the answer to the in-
quiry. 
Williston in his article on Liability for Honest 
Representation cites the early case of Burrows v. 
Lock, 10 Ves. Jr. 470 32 Eng. Rep. 927 as declaring 
the correct rule of liability in such a case as we have 
here. 
Lord Herschell in the leading English case of 
Derry 11. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cases (H.L.) 337, 
188 in holding that dishonesty was required for an 
action of deceit declared that liability for honest mis-
representation existed in an equitable action on good 
faith reliance in a class of actions such as this Petty 
case. He wrote, 
There is another class of actions which I 
must refer to also for the purpose of putting 
it aside. I mean those cases where a person 
within whose special province it lay to know 
a particular fact, has given an erroneous an-
swer to an inquiry made with regard to it by 
a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for 
the purpose of determining his course accord-
ingly, and had been held bound to make good 
the assurance he has given. Burrows v. Lock, 
10 Ves. Jr. 470, may be cited as an example, 
where a trustee had been asked by an intended 
lender, upon the security of a trust fund, 
whether notice of any prior incumbrance upon 
the fund had been given him. The defend-
ant innocently and honestly gave the answer 
that there was no prior encumbrance on the 
trust fund which turned out to be false .... 
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In cases like this it has been said that th~ 
circum~tances, t~at the a!1swe1· was honestli 
made, m the belief tf1at it was trne afford·~ 
no defense to the act10n. Accord, Williston & 
Thonipson Contrncts, Vol. 5, Sec. 15fl~ 
(1938) pp. 4208-9. ., 
The second reason for applying the modem rnle 
of liability to honest but careless or inaccurate rep. I 
resentations intended to induce substantial reliancP 
and which do so is well stated by the Arkansas Su. 
preme Court in Peoples National Bank of Little Rock 
v. Linberger Const. Co., 1951, 219 Ark. 11, 240 S.\Y. 
2d 12, 48 A.L.R. 2d 1086 - (cited as the case in 1 
point, plaintiff's reply brief p. 15.) The Court said. 
that the development toward increasing actions based 
on promissory estoppel which equally applies to equit· 
able actions of estoppel in pais based on reliance in 
good faith upon a representation of a futurt> ewnt. 
is an attempt by courts to keep abreast of 
increased moral consciousness of honesty aml 
fair representations in all business dealings. 
(Cases from part of the states mentioned 
above are cited by way of illustration.) 
The evolution in the law of deceit to the modern 
rule rejecting contributory negligence as a defense 
to intended deception is paralleled by similar denl· 
opment in actions for negligent or innocent misrep· 
resentation in a shift to duty of care and assumptiun 
d d 
,-,01) 
of risk by the representor. Prosser, Torts 3r e · 1o .. 
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The Prosser statement points the way the courts 
are going and the way we respectfully submit this 
Court should go in deciding loss between a negligent 
rrpresentor to a good faith inquirer in this particu-
lar class of case. 
Prosser writes at pages 372-373: 
The last half-century has seen a marked 
change in the attitude of the courts toward 
the question of justifiable reliance. Earlier 
decisions, under the influence of the prevalent 
doctrine of "caveat emptor," laid great stress 
upon the plaintiff's "duty" to protect himself 
and distrust his antagonist, and held that he 
was not entitled to rely even upon positive 
assertions of fact made by one with whom he 
was dealing at arm's length. It was assumed 
that any one may be expected to overreach 
another in a bargain if he can, and that only 
a fool will expect common honesty. Therefore 
the plaintiff must make a reasonable investi-
gation, and form his own judgment. The rec-
ognition of a new standard of business ethics, 
demanding that statements of fact be at least 
honestly and carefully made, and in many 
cases that they be warranted to be true, has 
led to an almost complete shift in this point of 
1·iew. Prosser on Torts, 3rd ed. 
We respectfully submit that the cases cited by 
the Court to support its decision are either distin-
guishable, hold centra or do not discuss at all the 
question of whether the law of good faith reliance 
or of contributory negligence should govern. 
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True, the Wheat case uses the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence to defeat the general contrac-
tor's recovery against the sub-contractor, - the ex-
pert on painting. However, although the California 
Supreme Court case of Drennan v. Star Paving Com-
pany, 333 P. 2d 757 is cited by this Court in deciding 
the Wheat case, the references to reasonable reli. 
ance are only dicta. The California Court found a 
failure of the duty of accuracy of representation 
by the defendant sub-contractor and held that "th£ 
fact that the sub-contractor's bid was the result of 
a mistake was no defense." It found no duty of i~­
vestigation as did this Court. 
The well reasoned Wycoff case rides off on the 
special fact of lack of definite and substantial injm~· 
and so is distinguishable. The Hilton case is one in 
which estoppel is used as a defense not 2.S basis for 
a cause of action. Plaintiff's brief pp. 6-7 surn-
maries the combination of facts necessary to recover 
on an equitable action of reliance. Only good faith 
actual reliance is required as in this Petty case when 
all the other requirements concur. 
Very few courts can and none ought to deny 
the forceful reasoning of Williston in rejecting the 
doctrine of contributory negligence as a defense to 
an equitable action of reliance for damages. He 
writes: 
Again, the doctrine of contributory negl!· 
gence would be troublesome to apply. Is it 
contributory negligence for a man to rely on 
1 
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what he is told by a person in a position to 
know, and to fail to make an investigation 
for himself? Though many decisions require 
that a plaintiff should not have been to fool-
ish in believing what no reasonable man in his 
position should believe, it is going too far, both 
in reason and on the authorities, to say that a 
plaintiff, unless his conduct was not wholly 
irrational, should lose his rights because he 
failed to make independent investigation and 
belieYed what he was told. It should not lie in 
the mouth of the man who induced his reliance 
to assert that the reliance was negligent. If 
a man makes a statement in regard to a mat-
ter upon which his hearer may reasonably 
suppose he has the means of information, and 
that he is speaking with full knowledge, and 
the statement is made as part of a business 
transaction, or to induce action from which 
the speaker expects to gain an advantage, he 
should be held liable for his misstatement. 
Such a principle most nearly harmonizes the 
law of misrepresentation in its various as-
pects. 22 Harv. L. R. 415, 437. 
It was reasonable for Gindy on September 25, 
1962 to anticipate as Freeway did that more than 
$17,000 commissions could be earned on what Gindy 
and Mickelson expected to ultimately materialize 
into orders for more than $400,000. That being true 
it was reasonable for Mr. Petty to place good faith 
reliance that the existing fact situation would pro-
duce more than $17,000 in commissions. See Peoples 
~ational Bank case supra and C.J.S. Sec. 80 approv-
ing recovery on honest representation of future con-
18 
dition based on judgment opinion regarding prese!I' 
fact situation. 
Let's summarize. The fact situation in eacl; 
equitable action of reliance on negligent, innr1ce
11
1 
misrepresentations must be carefully classified tG 
apply estoppel i11 pais. The induced loan-of-moner 
cases have all granted recovery: - Burrows cas~. 
1805 supra; the Burgess case, 1930 supra, and Pen. 
pie's National Bank case, 1951 supra. Also approna 
in Derry v. Peek, H.L., 1889 supra. 
The six factual requirements given by Pomero.r. 
Equity Jurisprudence, 1941, Sec. 805, ( App's Briti 
6-7) declare the risk of carefulness is on the rep· 
resentator. It is sufficient if the circumstances ar1 
such "that knowledge of them (the facts) is nec-
essarily imputed to him." The honest inquirPr 11iti1 
a known interest has no duty of im'estigation. H 
need only honestly rely, unless as Williston ai:·: 1 
Prosser state, his reliance is so foolish that no rea· 
sonable man would have relied under the circum· 
stances. The reason for the good faith rule in equin 
is that the representor deliberately intends that hii 
1 
language shall produce the specific substantial anu 
detrimental change of position which occurs, ani! 
the damages if the representation be negligenth 
or innocently made are the same as if it were done 
fraudulently. This situation imposes the equitabl~ · 
duty of carefulness. 
19 
Appellants respectfully pray for an order for 
a new trial or for application of the good faith rule. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. LADRU JENSEN, 
RICHARDS, BIRD and HART 
Attorneys for Appellants 
